Technical Reference - GRID & DIA
Purpose and positioning
This document exists to hold the implementation depth that does not belong in the high‑level Economic Argument.
It describes how GRID/DIA can be implemented using established digital identity and credential patterns, while keeping the economic narrative focused on outcomes.
Component overview
Global Registrar Information Directory (GRID)
What it is: a UN‑hosted directory of authoritative registrars (business registries, land registries, trade registries, etc.) and the information needed to verify what they issue.
What it is not: a centralized repository of entity data.
What GRID typically contains
- Registrar identity and official service endpoints (website, contact, verification service)
- Registrar digital identifiers (where used)
- Registrar verification material (e.g., public keys / trust anchors) required to authenticate evidence issued by the registrar
- Registrar metadata (jurisdiction, scope, governance and operational status)
Typical verifier questions GRID enables
- “Is this issuer the authoritative registrar for this jurisdiction?”
- “Where do I validate a credential issued by this registrar?”
- “What verification material should I use to authenticate what this registrar issues?”
Data sovereignty model
A strict “directory, not database” model:
- national registries remain authoritative and keep custody of their data
- GRID stores pointers and verification material, not the registries’ underlying entity records
- verification is performed against the authoritative source, not against copies
Digital Identity Anchor (DIA)
What it is: a standard “container” for legal‑entity identity assertions that is machine‑readable and cryptographically verifiable.
A DIA can hold (at minimum):
- legal name
- registration number / existing national identifier
- jurisdiction and registrar
- status (active, dissolved, etc.)
- key attributes required for cross‑border KYB decisions (as policy permits)
Why a credential model
Static documents (PDFs, images, email attachments) are easy to imitate. A credential model enables:
- tamper evidence: modifications invalidate the signature
- issuer authentication: the verifier can confirm the issuer is the authoritative registrar (via GRID trust anchors)
- automation: systems can validate without manual document inspection
Standards and formats
One feasible implementation uses:
- W3C Verifiable Credentials (VCs) for the credential envelope1
- JSON‑LD (or other serializations consistent with VC usage) for machine readability
- Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) (or equivalent issuer identifiers) to reference issuer and verification material
- conventional API integration patterns so national Single Window environments can issue and verify without replacing legacy systems
Multiple technical stacks can satisfy the same strategic objective. The key requirement is: issuer authenticity + tamper evidence + machine checkability + revocation.
Integration patterns
Minimal path: “directory‑only” participation
A country can participate by publishing:
- authoritative registrar identity + service endpoints
- governance and contact metadata
- verification material for what the registrar issues
This enables cross‑border verifiers to locate authoritative sources even before credential issuance is fully modernized.
Progressive path: DIA issuance
Over time, registrars can add:
- an issuance service (credential issuance)
- a verification service
- a revocation / status mechanism (so relying parties can detect stale or withdrawn evidence)
Interoperability with existing systems
GRID/DIA should not introduce new legal identifiers or replace national regimes. It wraps existing identifiers and adds verifiability:
- registrars remain the source of truth
- existing identifiers remain valid
- GRID enables discovery; DIA enables reusable evidence
Security and assurance considerations (optional depth)
Public/private key separation
Issuer authenticity depends on protecting signing keys:
- verifiers use public verification material (via GRID trust anchors)
- issuers protect private keys in national operational environments
Revocation and “freshness”
A credential that cannot be revoked or status‑checked becomes a liability. Implementations should support:
- explicit expiry
- online status checking (where feasible)
- revocation semantics aligned with registrar governance
Privacy and selective disclosure (where needed)
Some use‑cases benefit from “prove X without revealing Y” patterns. Where relevant, these can be implemented with selective disclosure and zero‑knowledge techniques, but they are not prerequisites for the economic case.